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1 Introduction 
 
Gender inequality at workplace issue has been actively discussed already for few decades 
and has strong historical routes that have shaped our perceptions on what is “right” and 
what is “wrong”.  This issue has been raised since 20th century, when feminists’ move-
ments started in Western society, and now more and more attention is paid on it. Gov-
ernments and organizations are trying to change discrimination practices and ensure the 
equality by introducing quotas and improving recruitment processes. For instance, re-
searches have revealed that blind auditions in Top US orchestras have increased the 
chances of women to get to the finals by 50%, which resulted in rise of the women 
representation in orchestras from 1970 to 2013 by more than 25% (Rice 2013). Another 
example is Apple, who promised to consider women to their boards after Sustainable 
Group was unhappy seeing only one woman on board (O’Connor 2014).  European Com-
mission also has introduced the gender quota for non-executive director positions in 
2012 for all public companies (European Commission 2012). The reason for this was that 
only 15% of non-executive board members were females and EC wanted to increase the 
equality.  
 
There are a lot of journal articles about inequality at workplace, since there are many 
debates on this topic.  Majority of authors claim that gender inequality at work is a major 
global problem that needs a solution, which has to include abandonment of stereotypical 
societal thinking. Historically, the role of women was to take care of household when 
men were earning money and leading armies. Even the greatest leaders of all times were 
men, such as Julius Ceasar, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, Winston Churchill and 
others. Of course, there were couple famous women, such as Queen Victoria and Indira 
Gandhi, but traditionally, men were seen as great leaders and this perception is very 
hard to battle even now.  In case of organizational culture for example, ”top manage-
ment” is often associated with “white men”, as it has been and continues to be the case 
most of the time even now since previous centuries (Chu 2014). For example, in the pool 
of the top 20 individuals across the UK FTSE 100 in 2014 95 per cent were white and 80 
per cent male (Ehenberg 2014). However, organizations are trying to combat uncon-
scious biases (the way of building links, patterns between subjects because of the com-
mon use of them together) and prioritise traits and skills over the gender (traits theory 
of the leadership). 
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Eagly claims that gender stereotypes are the reason that holds women back, however in 
the last 40 years it has changed and people are more open to having woman boss, since 
now mostly are the traits and skills that matter (Northwestern 2016). This is supported 
by research held by Yang and Aldrich (2014:314), which shows that gender influence is 
reducing when multiple merits are taken into the account to assign a leader. At the same 
time though, another research held by EU shows the opposite results: “the cumulative 
effects of gender and ethnic inequalities lead to a gender stratification in which native 
men have the best labour market opportunities and migrant and minority women are 
the most disadvantaged in many EU member states”: low pay, low status and insecure 
job (EU Monitoring Centre on racism and Xenophobia, 2003 cited in Kraal et al, 2009, 
ch. 1:11). However, partly it could be explained by lack of skills of immigrants, so eth-
nicity aspect has to be neglected and only personal characteristics in combination with 
gender should be discussed. 
 
Historically gender is one of the society-wide classification systems, which is logical tak-
ing into account differences. But how do these differences influence quality of work if 
both candidates have required skills? Mueller et al. (2002:165) claims that perception of 
women and men about their own skills and expectations differ (women generally accept 
the fact that expectations to them are lower, which is also proved by research made by 
Eagly (Northwestern 2016) (about participation in groups) and this eventually contrib-
utes to the gender stereotyping, division and discrimination. It could also influence the 
readiness to accept promotion opportunities. At the same time, however, women have 
different perception about communication, which is perceived to be the most essential 
leader's attribute (Medland, 2016). So the problem might be that forwarding the mes-
sage is what needed from leader of the company rather than two-way dialogue, which 
is needed for management level. What if it is not about inequality but about matching 
skills? What if women’s ability for two-way dialogue is more beneficial to the managerial 
level and one-way unobjectionable order positioning is required to become a director? 
 
Many authors agree that gender inequality at workplace is identified by the gender wage 
gap, concentration of women vs. men in the leadership positions, involvement in senior 
management and the difference in time needed for men and women to advance in their 
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careers (Stamarski 2015: 5; Mueller 2002: 173, 174; Yang and Aldrich 2014: 304). Ac-
cording to the research in US top companies, 65% of all the promotions to corporate 
executives goes to men (Strauss 2017). 
 
Gender Equality Recast Directive 2006/54/EC from the European Union Employment 
Law, stating that “there should be no direct or indirect discrimination on ground of sex 
in employment and occupation”, including access to employment, trainings, career ad-
vancement and working conditions (European Commission 2006) is hard to use; it is also 
difficult to prove the case of discrimination, since anything could be seen from the per-
spective of abilities and fit to the company.  
 
Wage gap is a major problem many researches are concerned about. On the other hand, 
some companies eliminate gender pay gap by making wage information public and avail-
able for employees (Elsesser, 2015). The only EU gender equality legislation is Article 
141 EC that states “Each Member State shall (...) ensure and subsequently maintain the 
application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal 
work” (European Commission 2008). However, current numbers show that majority of 
countries are breaking the law by having women’s wage represent only 70%-90% of the 
men’s for the same job (International Labour 2009, 19 cited in Mukhopadhyay, 2015: 
68). The issue with this legislation is that it can be cheated, since “an important question 
in equal pay cases is always whether the work performed by a female worker is ‘equal’ 
to the work performed by a male worker” (European Commission 2008). Unfortunately, 
the understanding of “equality” or “work of equal value” stays subjective and open to 
interpretations and therefore not really workable. Even though it is a very interesting 
topic, it will not be the focus of this work.  
 
1.1 What to expect from this paper 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse and examine relationship between female represen-
tation in top management and company performance. 
 
There has been some evidence shown of correlation between gender balance in the 
boards of directors and financial performance of the company in previous researches, 
however results were very controversial.  There were different performance indicators 
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and different calculation techniques used, which made results hard to compare. There-
fore, this paper is going to use the main factors to identify their correlation with the 
board composition. 
 
Firstly, the current situation in the world regrading gender balance in the higher layers 
of the organisations is going to be demonstrated with some statistics and examples from 
the individual companies. It will be shown that there is still unequal representation of 
genders in the top management and boards. 
 
Secondly, theoretical framework about benefits of the diverse management on the eco-
nomic results of the company in general and on board decision-making process in par-
ticular will be discussed followed by the real life examples. Deloitte will be one of the 
successful examples of the diversity management incorporation into the board of direc-
tors.  
 
Thirdly, the existing researches on this topic are going to be analysed and compared. It 
will be divided into sections by the performance factors used in the research. It will be 
seen that there is no single answer to the question whether there is a correlation after 
all or not. 
 
Lastly, the practical part is going to be presented. The data from 46 S&P500 top com-
panies is going to be analysed taken from the financial database. It includes ROI, ROE, 
ROA coefficients; revenues, innovation coefficients and assets/liabilities in addition to 
the board of directors’ composition information taken from the annual reports. Data from 
2013 and 2016 is going to be compared to identify the performance indicator and female 
representation change in % in order to be able to run the correlation analysis. 
 
Results are presented and analysed in the end of the report to drive conclusions, accept 
or reject the hypotheses, evaluate some shortcomings and limitations of the research 
and advise on future research practices followed by appendices with the correlation cal-
culations. 
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2 Literature review 
 
This chapter is going to present different statistics and results of the gender board com-
positions and its influence on company performance. Some benefits of diverse workforce 
in general and diverse top management in particular are going to be discussed followed 
by real-life examples. 
2.1 Current situation of the women representation in the top management 
 
Even though the quota was introduced by European Commission (EC) in 2012, there is 
still an underrepresentation of women on the senior positions. According to the European 
Commission (2016), only 23.3% of the leadership positions in the largest publicly-listed 
companies in the European Union (EU) were occupied by women.  It is worth remem-
bering however, that EC quota proposal was to influence only EU member states. The 
overall current situation for senior management positions taken by females in the world 
is shown in Figure 1 below. It is seen that on average 25% of the senior managers in 
the world were women in 2016. 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of senior management roles held by women. Source: Medland 2016 
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European Commission introduced quota in 2012, therefore it is worth analysing the sit-
uation in Europe and US since 2011 to spot the changes and compare the results. Table 
1 shows the situation in the UK for 2011 when only 5.5% of executive directors were 
women. In other countries the situation in 2011 was even worse, for example Germany, 
France, Norway and Switzerland had no female chief executives among the top listed 
companies at all; US was performing better with 4% of CEOs being females in S&P 500 
list (Kollewe 2015). 
Table 1. Percentage of Companies with female CEOs per country in 2011. Source: Kollewe 2015 
 
 
 
 
In 2014 the UK market reported that only 20,7% of board members in FTSE 100 com-
panies were women, which was almost 100% increase from 2011, when the figure was 
only 12.5%, however the result was still far from the gender balanced board formula 
(Chu 2014).  By 2015, only 41 out of FTSE100 companies have achieved the target of 
25% female directors on the board. In addition, even though it is indicated already as a 
4,5% increase from 2011, there were only 24 female executive directors in the FTSE100 
in 2015 (Vinnicombe et al. 2015: ch.3), which comprised less than 10% of executive 
directors claimed by MWM Consulting (Kollewe 2015). These numbers above indicate 
slight improvements in women representation on board in the timeframe between 2011 
and 2015, but still the percentage was quite low. 
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Report for 2017 however already shows that 56% of the FTSE100 companies have at 
least 27% female directors, which confirms the consistent uprising trend towards gender 
equality on board in the UK (Vinnicombe et al. 2017: 1). The representation of women 
directors increased almost by 28 through thought the last year and this tendency allows 
us to assume that by 2020 it would be possible to achieve 33% women boards in FTSE 
100 (Vinnicombe et al. 2017: 1). On the other hand, the female executive directorship 
number has increased only by one since 2015. An increase in women representation is 
seen in France and Germany as well since 2011 but by a very small number: only 2% 
and 1% respectively of CEOs are females (Snyder 2017).  
 
Currently US has the largest percentage of the female CEOs, which equals to 8% and 
UK is a follow-up with 6% at the moment (Snyder 2017).  On average 28% of the top 
60 NAFE’s list executives are women (Strauss 2017) and 5.2% (26 people) for S&P 500 
list (Catalyst 2018) (See Figure 2 below), which shows that US is ahead of UK and the 
rest of Europe. Another example of it is that 32% of the top companies NAFE highlights 
have at least five women on their boards in 2017 (Strauss 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2. Catalyst, Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies (February 2, 2018). Source: Catalyst 
2018 
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2.2 Some obstacles and reasons for inequality 
 
There are some obstacles in society for a woman to take a leadership position or become 
a director on the board. The first female leader of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, has shared 
with the Guardian her own experience from the early career revealing that she was 
warned by a reputable company in France that her sex is going be an obstacle for her 
to become a partner (Chu 2014). 
 
There are quite a few research papers published on this topic. For example, Yang and 
Aldrich (2014: 314) point out that entrepreneurs often launch a business with co-found-
ers and if this co-founder is a woman, she is most likely not going to be the «Boss». This 
research is based mostly on spousal co-founders, but some great points are made on 
general topic. Gender stereotypes and social perceptions of leaders intensively constrain 
women's access to power position and scientists supporting merit-based view believe 
that gender still remains a major factor for distributing rewards and leadership roles 
(Yang and Aldrich, 2014: 306).  
 
Ridgeway (1997 cited in Mueller 2002:165) also recognizes that organizational culture is 
the factor influencing inequality, since some of the companies are gender-bias. There 
are still quite many «sexist organizations». The problem might have not been solved yet 
because of lack of measures taken by the higher layers of societies. There are some 
legislations introduced in the EU mentioned in the Introduction, but how effective and 
accurate are they? As discussed above, European Commission established quota legisla-
tion in 2012 and it can be seen from Figure 3 that there are some improvements seen 
by 2015. On average across all the sector there has been 10% increase in women rep-
resentation on board of directors since 2011 (ISS and EU 2016).  However, companies 
who wanted to avoid the regulation went private (Ahern 2012: 169). 
 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of women on boards per sector (2011-2015). Source:  ISS and EU 2016 
 
 
2.3 Benefits of the diverse workforce 
 
The results from the research conducted by Kakabadse et al. (2015) indicate the im-
portance of female board members, as it encourages mix of skills and backgrounds to 
be incorporated into the company processes, which results in the higher quality of the 
decisions leading to the greater company efficiency. The study shows that most of the 
respondents believe that female representation in the board encourages creativity and 
discussions, minimizes “groupthink” and improves problem-solving that may become a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Kakabadse et al. 2015). 
 
The claim that companies having diverse workforce are more innovative as well is sup-
ported by Forbes Insights (Rizy et al.)  magazine. Having varied experiences and opinions 
leads to generating new competitive solutions about product and practices improve-
ments, which stimulates innovation intensity. This may lead to the higher demand or 
cost reductions, which not only creates more profits but also benefits other financial 
performance indicators. 
 
Kanter’s study (1983) shows that the most innovative companies are creating heteroge-
neous teams in order to encourage ideas, recognizing that the best solution could be 
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found by considering multiple points of view (Cox, 1994:32). These practices could be 
justified by the statement made by Delloite Tax manager that ''when at least one of the 
team members has similar traits with end user, the entire team understands customer 
better and therefore there is a greater chance to succeed'' (Hewlett et al, 2013). The 
same could be argued to be true in regard to the board members, if at least one of them 
has similar traits to the employees (females), it may be easier to manage and coordinate 
their work and if both parties understand each other, efficiency may increase. What is 
more, female directors may initiate product line development which will benefit female 
segment of the target market, which may not happen if the board is male-only. Fulfilling 
needs of different segments may enrich customer database by retaining loyal customers 
and recruiting new ones, which definitely will have a positive effect on the revenues of 
the company.   
 
What is more, research held by Hewlett et al. (2013) shows that the companies with 
diversity, who encourage ''out of box'' ideas and accept ideas of cultural minorities, out-
innovate and out-perform others. 
 
Research shows that diverse workforce has an influence on financial performance of the 
company: diverse companies have better financial results (Hunt et al. 2015). Diversity 
leads to better ability to win top talents and improvement of customer orientation, em-
ployee satisfaction and decision-making, which inevitably leads to the better returns 
(Hunt et al. 2015). It is proved by research held by McKinsey (Barta et al. 2012) that 
there is a correlation between board diversity and returns (See Figure 4).  Companies 
with high executive-board diversity (top quartile in Figure 4) had on average 53 percent 
higher ROEs than the ones with the lower diversity (Bottom quartile). In addition, EBIT 
margins in the most diverse companies were 14 percent higher than in the least diverse 
ones (Barta et al. 2012). 
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Figure 4. Correlation between board diversity and returns. Source: McKinsey and Company. 
Source: Barta et al. 2012 
 
Another example of financial success because of the diversity could be Deloitte Tax. It 
is one of the companies that promotes diversity by investing around £30m yearly into 
diversity learning and development (Delloite UK 2015:15).  In 2015, 66% of new recruit-
ers were women or minorities (Llopis 2016), which was followed by increase in revenue 
the same year, which could be seen from Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5. Deloitte UK Annual Report 2015.   Source: Deloitte UK 2015:15 
 
 
However, it cannot be proved that there is a direct relationship between diversity and 
financial performance as there are other factors shaping and influencing results at the 
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same time (Barta et al. 2012). However, it shows a consistent trend which cannot be 
ignored or random. 
 
2.4 Benefits of the diverse boards 
 
Diversity management is more and more becoming part of the organisational strategy 
(Moss 2009 : ch.2), as it has financial impact: reduces labour costs, recruitment, turnover 
and training (McEnrue 1993 cited in Moss 2009: ch.2), encourages growth possibilities: 
greater creativity and new product development (McEnrue 1993 cited in Moss 
2009:ch.2), improved innovation capability (Nieto and Quevedo 2005 in Moss 2009) and 
better “corporate agility” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003 cited in Moss, 2009: ch.2) and, of 
course, it allows to provide better service:  understanding of customer needs (Day and 
Van den Bulte, 2002 in Moss 2009 :ch.2), better customer loyalty (Rigby, 2006 cited in 
Moss 2009:ch.2) and greater ability to adapt to changing environments (Lowell and Za-
nini 2005 cited in Moss 2009:ch.2).   To obtain all these competitive advantages listed 
above that become more and more of a strategic focus, the diversity has to be fostered 
at the organisational level (Moss 2009: ch.2), and therefore it has to come from the 
board. Smith (2014) claims that if the board and the senior management are not the 
same diverse as workforce, companies might experience communication problems, 
which inevitably influence company’s performance. This also supports the argument 
made by author in the previous chapter about leaders’ better understanding their em-
ployees’ needs if they have similar traits. Therefore, diversity management should begin 
from the top level of the organizational hierarchy pyramid. Figure 6 reflects the signifi-
cance of the correlation between diversity on board and company performance factors 
found by Moss (2009). According to Fenton and Neil (2012: ch.1) the smaller p-value is, 
the more statistically significant the result is and the less chances are that relationship 
found is random. Figure 6 shows that p-value (extent of correlation) is lower than 0.001 
meaning that correlation is statistically highly significant and exists. 
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Figure 6. Extent of the correlation between board diversity and various performance factors. 
Source: Moss 2009: ch.2 
 
According to different researchers, the companies with diverse board of directors can 
fulfil the stakeholders’ requirements and needs better, as diversity brings variety of the 
opinions to the board and it helps to find the best solution (Solimene et al. 2017). Ac-
cording to an MSCI study of 6,500 global companies, firms with board diversity face less 
governance scandals and greater equity and capital returns, which can be justified by 
less groupthink and a better understanding of both customers and diverse workforce 
needs (FT 2015).   
 
On the other hand, Smith (2014) argues against the assumption that diverse board is 
more effective than homogeneous. Experts point at a significant financial results’ de-
crease of the companies with a vast number of women in leading positions. This argu-
ment is supported by Eagly, who claims that we are used to be surrounded by similar 
people, therefore the attempt to diversify the workforce might lead towards drop in 
efficiency and smoothness of group work (Elsesser 2016). 
 
Research held by Adams and Ferreira (2009: 292) has identified the tendency that 
women are better with attendance and are likely to influence their male colleagues’ at-
tendance patterns positively according to S&P companies. However, it is not clear 
whether better attendance guarantees better results. But this is already a topic for an-
other research. 
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2.5 Previous research 
 
One of the solutions offered to decrease inequality in the companies’ management was 
quota: specific number of women has to be in the board of directors or in the senior 
management layer (Northwestern 2016). This could be argued to be unfair, since it 
would inevitably lead towards positive discrimination but against men this time, when to 
the positions females would be chosen even in case of males having better qualifications. 
On the other hand, in theory diversification of boards would lead towards different ad-
vantages mentioned in the previous chapter. The question is whether diversification 
works in real life or not? 
 
Lately, there have been quite a few papers written on the topic of the relationship be-
tween women representation in the top management and company performance, how-
ever the results are quite controversial and the topic is very recent itself. Consequently, 
issue requires more and more research on it. There are different findings by several 
researches presented in this chapter that demonstrate that no defined conclusion can 
be made on this matter yet.  
 
Some authors claim that increase in female representation on boards positively influ-
ences company performance and is a “driving force of performance” (European Com-
mission 2012). Others claim that “the composition of boards, in terms of characteristics 
such as gender diversity, age dispersion and the share of directors chosen by the em-
ployees, is likely to be relevant as it influences board decision-making processes” (Bøh-
ren 2007 cited in Marinova et al. 2015: 1779). However, the direction of the influence is 
not clear. Therefore, this chapter is going to present and compare different researches 
on the issue in order to be able to develop hypothesis for the current work. To make it 
easier for the reader, the chapter is going to be divided into sections by performance 
factor analysed. 
 
2.5.1 ROI, ROA, ROE 
 
First financial performance factors to analyse are return on investment (ROI), return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Example of Norway, who was first to introduce 
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the quota law, shows that there was no influence of quota neither on ROA nor on reve-
nue and greater women representation did not have any influence on the company per-
formance in general (Dale-Olsen et al. 2013:124-127). On the other hand, Carter et al. 
(2010) researched firms in the S&P 500 in the period between 1998 and 2002 to find 
out the relationship between firm’s performance and the gender diversity on board. The 
research showed a positive and significant relationship between the number of female 
directors and the ROA (Solimene et al., 2017). 
 
The Credit Suisse Research Institute’s research that included data from 2,360 companies 
worldwide from 2006 to 2012 found out that if the companies with a market capitalization 
of more than $10 billion have at least one female director, they perform better than 
companies with no women on board by 26 percent (Lilienfeld, 2014:19). This research 
also showed that companies with gender balanced boards experienced ”higher net in-
come growth, lower net debt-to-equity ratio, and faster reduction in debt compared to 
companies with all-male boards” (Lilienfeld, 2014:19). Contradictory, research by Chap-
ple and Humphrey (2014) on American (S&P 300) and Australian (ASX 300) listed com-
panies does not show any significant correlation between women representation and 
financial results. 
 
The study conducted by Catalyst (2004) which ranked the Fortune 500 companies ac-
cording to the women representation on their top management starting form the highest 
% and compared financial performance of top 25% of the companies to the lowest 25% 
(return on equity (ROE), sales and total return to shareholders), showed better results 
among the top companies (Elsesser 2016). Results showed that companies with the 
lower women representation on their boards had  2/3 lower ROI than the companies 
with the highest number of females (Elsesser 2016). Catalyst (2004) found out that 
performance indicators, such as return on equity and total return to shareholders were 
around 1/3 higher in case of higher women representation on board. Research held on 
Asian firms from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore has shown the posi-
tive impact of female directors on firm ROE as well (Low et al. 2015:397). 
 
Eagly, however, argues that high increase in ROI is not justified by increase in women, 
as there is no control over direction of causality and more importantly, it is impossible 
to eliminate the possibility of the third variable existence, which influences both women 
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hiring and company performance (Elsesser 2016). She also claims that when using so-
phisticated statistical techniques, the influence of women representation vanishes away 
(as no correlation is shown anymore). This argument makes it very hard to analyse and 
interpret research results; and advices to use as many variables that possibly may influ-
ence company performance in the calculation formula as possible. 
 
Another research held among large 1,050 listed companies in the UK, US and India has 
also revealed that the companies with the male-only boards are missing on about 
US$655 billion in comparison to diverse-board peers in 2014 in terms of ROA (ROI) 
(Lagerberg 2015). Figure 7 shows the diverse board companies outperformance by coun-
try and demonstrates how losses of the male-only boards sums up to US$655 billion.  In 
comparison to given work though, similar research conducted on SMEs (small and me-
dium enterprises) in the UK has shown the opposite result with the negative relation 
between board diversity and accounting performance measures (Shenata et al. 2017). 
As a result, the size of the company may play a big role in the outcomes of the research 
and results may differ significantly.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Diverse board companies’ win over male-only board counter partners. Source: Lager-
berg 2015 
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2.5.2 Acquisition 
 
Does board composition influence acquisitions? Ahern and Dittmar (2012:169) assume 
that the reason for the company performance changes might be the differences in char-
acteristics between new females and exiting males. Their analysis shows that even 
though new members are younger and less- experiences on the CEO positions, they are 
more likely to be higher educated. Ahern’s research shows that with the increase of the 
women representation, companies are increasing their financial risks and are involved in 
acquisition processes more than others (Ahern 2012: 180). “The magnitude of the coef-
ficient estimates implies meaningful increase of 1 to 4 percentage points of acquisition 
relative to assets for a 20% increase in female representation” (Ahern 2012: 180). 
 
On the other hand, according to the research held by Chen et al (2014) on US public 
firms showed that greater female representation on the board leads to the acquisition 
activity diminution. This might be because women are more risk averse due to high 
emotionality (Byrnes et al, 1999, in Carlsson et al., 2010). This finding is also supported 
by research held by Jizi and Nehme (2017), confirming that women’s presence on boards 
positively influences firms’ risks by decreasing stock return volatility. 
 
However, the acquisition activities may bring better returns to the company in the future, 
these investment practices cannot guarantee to be successful. Therefore, higher or lower 
acquisition intensity do not necessarily mean better performance. It describes the com-
pany behaviour change towards being more or less risky and active on market in quali-
tative terms, but research is trying to identify quantitative results.  What is more, acqui-
sition practices are most likely to be reflected in ROI performance factor in the number 
of years from acquisition action taking place, which is analysed in this paper. Therefore, 
author decided not to consider acquisition practices as a separate performance indicator. 
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2.5.3 Firm value, revenue and gross profit 
 
This section is going to present an overview of research findings in regard to firm value, 
revenue and gross profit changes due to board composition change. For example, Cris-
tian Dezsö and David Ross (2012), who studies gender diversity effect on the top firms’ 
performance in Standard & Poor's Composite 1500 list, found out the positive correlation 
between two variables. They examined the relationship between gender composition of 
firm’s top management and its financial performance; findings show that female repre-
sentation in top management leads to an increase of $42 million in firm value.  
 
Another example showing positive results, but this time in revenue and profit growth, 
due to the gender diverse board, is Sodexo. 40% of all staff members in Sodexo in 2016 
were women (just 17% in 2009); 43% of the members on the board of directors were 
females and the company run 14 Gender Balance Networks worldwide. Researchers 
found out on the example of Sodexo that when there is an optimal gender balance in 
the company, employee engagement increases by 4% and gross profit increases by 23% 
(Burke, 2016).  
 
At the same time, Ahern and Dittmar (2012:188) on the example of the Norwegian mar-
ket after the quota law implementation, show that sudden increase in female represen-
tation leads to the significant economic decrease in value. It is explained by board char-
acteristic changes brought by new female directors that may lead to board become dys-
functional (Ahern 2012: 163) or by intensity of the acquisitions caused by greater female 
representation, which is inevitably reflected in the firm value. This argument alone would 
not show that female representation leads towards decline of the value neither would it 
prove the opposite. It would just draw our attention towards the fact that even if the 
positive influence of the women representation on the performance of the company is 
going to be proved during this work, the introduction of the law has to be done gradually 
and thoughtfully and not forcefully, otherwise result could be reverse. However, Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012: 164) also have found out that there is a high threat for long-run 
value loss. On the other hand, when more variables are taken into account, the results 
are insignificant and void (Ahern 2012: 167). This research emphasises the controversial 
nature of the results depending on data and methods used. 
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For the Latin American study conducted by Pletzer et al (2015) the results did not show 
any significant relationship between female representation and overall company perfor-
mance. The correlation coefficient equals 0.0195, which falls under the category of 
0.5>|r| and very close to 0, meaning that there is no correlation between variables and 
the result is statistically insignificant according to p-value. On the other hand, another 
research conducted by Flabbi indicates a significant positive impact of female board rep-
resentation on profit margins (increase by 14%) in the region overall, however it admits 
that it differs from sub region to sub region, because of the characteristics differences 
(2017:807). 
 
2.5.4 Innovation 
 
Another performance indicator to analyse is innovation intensity by comparing R&D co-
efficients. Hewlett et al. (2013) claim that companies whose leaders have diversity traits 
out-perform and out-innovate their peers. It is shown that the probability of market 
share growth for those companies is 45% higher and the chance to capture a new mar-
ket is 70% higher than for others, as their ability to innovate increases. And gender-
balanced board is one way of the leadership diversification. 
 
Research by Horak (2017:859), however, explored the tendency when female represen-
tation influences negatively on the R & D investment rise. It was shown that boards with 
no women invest more in R&D that their counter partners. However, this research has 
low statistical significance levels (high p-value) and high error rate of 28% and cannot 
be considered accurate. Therefore, it shall not be taken into the consideration. The same 
research has not given any significant differences in returns on equity, showing no rela-
tion between women representation and financial success. On the other hand, asset 
growth (of 6,3%) and sales growth (of 6,87%) comes with confidence level of 90% and 
80% respectively in the Chinese automotive industry (Horak, 2017:857).  
 
Dezsö and Ross’s research has indicated that companies prioritizing innovation got 
greater financial gains when women were part of the leadership positions, however, they 
also found out that female presence in top management benefits innovation intensity 
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and company performance “only to the extent that a firm’s strategy is focused on inno-
vation” (Dezsö 2012: 1073). This argument offers that there is no correlation between 
board composition and R&D coefficient. 
 
2.5.5 Researches with using Tobin’s Q 
 
There are some researchers that use Tobin’s Q as an indicator of the correlation. The 
research held in Spain, for example, has shown a positive correlation between board 
gender diversity and the company financial performance (Reguera-Alvarado et al. 
2015: 347). The research on Danish market though shows that gender in relation to 
board composition does not influence firm performance at all (Rose, 2007). Tobin’s Q 
was used in this research as well and it was close to zero when the cross-sectional 
regression was used, meaning that there is no dependence between variables. Carter et 
al (2010 cited in Solimene, 2017) have found the same result with no significant rela-
tionship between women representation and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009:306), however, while examining correlation between gender 
diversity on board and Tobin’s Q, have revealed that the relationship appears to be 
negative.  
 
As a result of comparing different works, it is seen that Tobin’s Q declined for Norway 
with increase in women representation (Ahern 2012); it increased for Netherlands and 
Denmark (Marinova et al. 2015) but decreased in another research of the same region 
(Rose, 2017). Tobin’ s Q is a measure showing ratio of market value of the company to 
replacement cost of assets and the higher this ratio is the better, as it indicates future 
growth opportunities if it is over 1 (Marinova et al. 2015: 1782). Tobin’s Q however is 
considered to be a bad method for comparing the company performance, because “it 
likely contains a great deal of measurement error because of a conceptual gap between 
true investment opportunities and observable measures…” (Erickson 2012: 1286).  
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2.6 Results from the literature review 
 
Results are very controversial and no consistent trends or results are seen. For example, 
some researchers found that revenue (gross profit) as an indicator of financial perfor-
mance was increasing with greater number of women on board (Horak 2017; Flabbi 
2017; Burke 2016; Lilienfeld 2016 and Deloitte 2015). There are also authors, who 
claimed the positive relationship between factors, such as ROA, ROI and ROE, and board 
diversity (Barta et al. 2012; Carter et al. 2010; Elsesser 2016; Low et al. 2015 and Lager-
berg 2015), however there are the ones claiming the negative relationship   (Shenata et 
al. 2017) or no correlation at all (Horak 2017 and Dale-Olsen et al. 2013). The same 
situation was with firm value, when Dezsö and Ross (2012) found out the positive rela-
tionship, but Ahern and Dittmar (2012) experienced the opposite results. Our literature 
review consists of 3 different outcomes for Tobin’s Q correlation with female represen-
tation being positive for Reguera- Alvardo et al. 2017), negative for Rose (2007) and 
neutral for Carter et al. (2010). Innovation intensity has been positively increasing in 
Hewlett et al. (2013) research, declining in research of Horak (2017) with female repre-
sentation increase and was confirmed to be influential by other factors than board com-
position in Dezsö and Ross (2012). 
 
It should be pointed out that even when the positive correlation is indicated, it cannot 
be proved that there is a direct relationship between gender diversity and financial per-
formance as there are other factors shaping and influencing results at the same time 
(Barta et al. 2012). Smith et al. (2006 cited in Marinova 2015:1778) also claims that in 
this type of study the direction of causality is always questionable: “more female board 
directors may contribute to higher firm performance, but it might also be the case that 
better-performing firms tend to appoint more women on their boards”. Dezsö and Ross 
(2012:1073) have also indicated in their research that results on this topic are very con-
troversial and do not identify the direction of the causality. 
 
Looking at all the results summarised above, it is very hard to make conclusions after 
theoretical secondary research. Therefore, practical research has to be conducted. 
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2.7 Knowledge gap 
 
Majority of the sources are minimum 3 years old, which means situation could have 
already changed. Companies started incorporating more diversity policies and some gov-
ernments introducing the quota law, therefore current situation might be more accurate 
and with more distinct results. Therefore, literature review could be used for the theo-
retical background and for hypothesis making, but actual data should come from the 
databases to reveal up-to-date results.  
 
What is more, every research in the literature review used different financial performance 
indicators and different calculation methods, which leads to the complexity in interpret-
ing/comparing results and drawing conclusions. Researched questions are offered below 
followed by hypotheses and methodology statement. 
 
2.8 Research question and hypothesis 
 
The aim of this research is to identify whether there is a relationship between gender 
balance on board and company performance analysing different factors of the financial 
success.  
 
According to the results from the theoretical part, author decided to introduce two hy-
potheses for the practical part. The aim of the primary research is either support or reject 
those: 
 
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive correlation between women representation in top man-
agement and financial performance of the company. 
 
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive correlation between women representation in top man-
agement and investment intensity. 
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter is going to introduce the research design, analysis structure and calculation 
formulas used to conduct the research. 
 
As part of this research top 46 S&P 500 companies (taken from Slickcharts 2018), as per 
27 January 2018, are analysed to define whether there is a correlation between women 
representation on board and company performance. The idea was to use sample of 10% 
from the S&P registered companies, however, due to unavailability of some data used 
for analysis among the last companies chosen from the list, the amount had to be re-
duced by 4. The purpose of this part is to correlate the differences in women represen-
tation on boards of the corporations from 2013 to 2016 by taking data from the annual 
reports provided by the companies to the public use with changes in different perfor-
mance factors from the same time period. Performance factors used are ROA, ROI, ROE, 
revenue, firm value and innovation intensity, as these are the ones brought in by differ-
ent authors in the literature review part. Pearson’s correlation method is going to be 
used, which only identifies linear relationship. Pearson’s correlation coefficient is found 
by using Excel formulas and significance level of the relationship is found through the 
regression analysis and ANOVA tables. 
 
Even though, some authors used additional variables in their formulas in similar experi-
ments, such as country development index, income index and mean board size (Pletzer 
et al. 2015), the calculation used in the current research is straightforward and simple: 
the percentage change in women representation is correlated with the percentage dif-
ference in performance factor. It is possible to do so, as this research is based on the 
companies operating in the same country (US) and having boards more or less of the 
same size. What is more, the % change in female representation is used for analysis, 
therefore board size variable can be omitted.  
 
According to the previous researches held by different academics from all over the world, 
with the presence of women in the top management the firm value increases and 
companies prioritize innovation (Derzsö 2012). In addition, it was explored by Burke 
(2016) that gross profit of the company is influenced by gender balance in the 
management layers. However, there were contradictory findings presented in the 
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literature review part as well.  Therefore, to make own conclusions from recent data, 
this research is held. 
 
To research the relation between women representation in the top management and the 
company performance and either support or decline the findings above, research on all 
factors indicating financial performance is made.  
 
To conduct this research the secondary data is used: annual reports about the 
management layout and database with financial reports. I am comparing financial 
performance data from year 2013 and 2016 taken from FINRA database (FINRA 2018) 
in relation to the gender composition change in the top management of the companies.  
 
As some companies operating in service sector do not have gross profit number, to make 
my research consistent revenue is going to be compared instead. Research by Sodexo 
(2016), Deloitte (2015) and Horak (2017:857) have found revenue and women increase 
relationship to be positive, however Dale-Olsen et al. (2013:124-127) has shown no 
correlation between two variables. To find relationship, the revenue change between 
two years should be found. To do so, income statements from two years have to be 
compared. Formula used to calculate the difference is (Revenue (2016) - Revenue 
(2013)) / Revenue (2013) (Appendix 1). Another factor indicating companies’ 
performance is firm value. To indicate company value, total liabilities have to be 
distracted from the total assets. This information could be found on the balance sheets 
from both years and the final results compared the same way as revenue: (Firm value 
(2016) - Firm value (2013))/ Firm value (2013) (Appendix 5).  
 
In addition, the factor brought by Dezsö (2012) and Horak (2017:859) is the tendency 
of the companies with the high number of women in the management to favour 
innovation.  Indicator for this aspect is the R&D ratio. The difference is going to be found 
through the following formula: (R&D coef. (2016) - R&D coef. (2013))/ R&D coef. (2013). 
Calculations can be found from Appendix 6.  
 
28 
 
 
Return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are 
other performance factors brought by different researchers into the account as being 
influenced by board gender composition. These three indicators are taken from the 
financial statements of the companies and compared the same way: (ROA/ ROI/ ROE 
(2016) – ROA/ROI/ ROE (2013))/ ROA/ROI/ROE (2013) (Appendices 2-4). 
 
In order to perform a correlation analysis, women representation numbers are going to 
be taken from annual reports of both years and difference presented in decimal points 
to make correlation easier and clearer. The formula used to calculate the change is 
(Woman % (2016)- Woman % (2013)) / Woman % (2013). 
 
No Tobin’s Q is used in this research because of the complicated calculations, difficulty 
to interpret and difference in accounting methods used by banks and insurance 
companies. Results of these companies would not be comparable with others and this 
paper has some banks in the sample. After changes for each variable are calculated 
according to the formulas above, the correlation coefficient has to be found and 
significance levels determined. 
4 Results 
 
This section is going to review the results for each factor separately. When looking for 
correlation, it is important to execute both steps. First of all, the coefficient of correlation 
has to be found that indicates the strength and the direction of the relationship. Sec-
ondly, the significance level has to be identified. Significance F could be found through 
ANOVA table of the regression analysis and it equals to p-value. The lower p-value the 
better, as it demonstrates the possibility in % that the relationship found is random 
(Fenton and Neil 2012: ch.1). Therefore, statistically if p-value is higher than 5% the 
analysis is inaccurate and results shall not be used. Another way to check whether your 
correlation is valid is in the statistical table (Figure 8). Left-hand column indicates the 
number of observations and the column headings identify the allowed significance F (p-
value) levels that make results statistically significant. We check the highest allowed p-
value of 0.05 and identify the lowest acceptable correlation coefficient for the result to 
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be valid. Please note: significance level and significance F are not the same. Signifi-
cance level indicates how statistically significant the results are and the lower Signifi-
cance F (p-value) is the higher statistical significance level is observed. This research has 
used 46 companies for analysis, therefore data for either 40 or 50 observations from the 
table shall be used. We can see that the lowest value of the correlation coefficient for 
this research to be statistically significant has to be 0.23 or 23%. However, due to the 
data availability, some of the performance factors were correlated with the smaller 
amount of data pairs. As a result, the lowest correlation value should be checked case 
by case in the section below. 
 
 
Figure 8. Correlation coefficient value depending on the p-value (chance for correlation to be 
random) and number of observations. Source: Oneonta 2018 
 
The strength and direction of the correlation are identified according to the following 
rules. The results are interpreted according to Devore and Farnum (2005) as per corre-
lation coefficient absolute value being equal to: 
0.00-0.1 – “no correlation” 
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0.1-0.5 – “weak correlation” 
0.5-0.8 – “moderate correlation” 
0.8- 1.0 – “strong correlation”. Figure 9 demonstrates the strength and direction of the 
correlation visually. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Strength and direction of the correlation coefficient. Source: Devore and Farnum 2005: 
109 
 
If the correlation coefficient is close to 0, it does not indicate lack of any correlation 
between variables, only linear. If the coefficient is negative, it indicates the opposite 
movement of the correlated variables: increase in one leads to decrease in another. 
 
To ensure there is a correlation between two variables, both correlation strength must 
be decent (at least greater than 0.1 in absolute value) and p-value (extent of the corre-
lation) identifying statistical significance level has to be acceptable (no more than 0.05). 
The following sections are going to present the results from the primary research and 
analyse the validity of the observations. 
 
Please note: Appendices display data for differences in decimal points and if the differ-
ence shown is 0.00 it does not equal to 0, just data could not be fit into the table to 
show further decimal points. It was not really necessary, as the formula used for the 
calculation is available in the methodology part and original data is shown in the appen-
dices. However, reader can be sure that reference cells were used where every decimal 
was calculated without being rounded to 0.00 shown due to capacity. 
 
4.1 Revenue 
 
In this analysis, revenue changes between 2013 and 2016 are calculated and correlated 
to the women representation on board differences.  
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Appendix 1. demonstrates very weak positive correlation between changes in women 
representation on board and revenue changes. It identifies that the more women on 
board the better revenue is but correlation is so weak and close to 0 (r=0.0014) that 
according to Devore and Farnum (2009: 109) indicates no correlation. In addition, only 
R2= 0.15% (Figure 10) of the variable Y is described by this linear regression, which is 
a very insignificant number. Therefore, conclusion would be: there is no mutual linear 
relationship between revenue and women representation changes on board, according 
to Devore and Farnum (2005) value table above. This could be also seen from the scatter 
plot below (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Scatter plot showing correlation between women representation and revenue (Original 
2018) 
 
 
Even without checking the extent of the correlation for this analysis, we see that there 
is no correlation. But after having a look into the p-value (Significance F) from the Table 
2, we can state that 99% chance of the relationship being random is not acceptable 
even if the correlation coefficient would have indicated the significant result. To con-
clude, revenue and board diversity do not have any LINEAR relationship at all. 
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Table 2. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for revenue and diversity variables (Original 2018) 
 
 
 
 
4.2 ROA 
 
In this part, ROA coefficients were taken from the financial database and difference in 
% between two years was calculated. Calculations could be seen from the Appendix 2 
and the calculation formula could be found from the methodology section. After running 
the correlation analysis to identify relationship between return on assets and female 
representation on board changes, weak negative correlation was revealed with r= -0.19. 
Appendix 2 is showing the calculations and observations as well as variables dependence 
could be seen from the Figure 11 below. 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.001403952
R Square 1.97108E-06
Adjusted R Square-0.022220207
Standard Error 0.513111033
Observations 47
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2.34E-05 2.34E-05 8.87E-05 0.992527262
Residual 45 11.84773 0.263283
Total 46 11.84776
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.189416431 0.077241 2.452279 0.018139 0.033845136
X Variable 1 0.010360206 1.100043 0.009418 0.992527 -2.205239711
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Figure 11. Scatter plot showing relationship between women representation on board and ROA 
(Original 2018) 
 
 
 
The second step would be to identify the validity of the result. In order to do this, we 
should check significance F from the ANOVA table below (Table 3). The value is 20% in 
this analysis, which is too high for the correlation result to be statistically valid. If we 
check data from the Figure 8, we also see that with the amount of the observations of 
46, the critical value for correlation with the highest possible error of 5% would be 0.23 
and our result is slightly below this mark. The conclusion would be that there is a weak 
negative correlation between variables with a low statistical significance. 
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Table 3. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for women representation and ROA (Original 2018) 
 
 
 
4.3 ROE 
 
This section is running a similar analysis to the previous one, but using ROE coefficients 
from both years instead. The result shows a weak negative correlation with value of -
0.21, which is described and shown in the Appendix 3 and Figure 12 below. R2   indicates 
the proportion of dependable variable (Y) being explained by independent (X). In our 
analysis women representation on board is an independent variable and any financial 
performance factor is a dependable, as it changes with females increase/decrease. As 
explained before, negative correlation means that with increase of independent variable, 
dependant is decreasing. Only 4,5% of variables (companies) in this research follow the 
trend where with the increase of female representation the ROE decreases following this 
linear regression formula. 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.188126
R Square 0.035392
Adjusted R Square0.013956
Standard Error 0.054394
Observations 47
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.004884982 0.004885 1.651052 0.205390452
Residual 45 0.133141856 0.002959
Total 46 0.138026837
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.002851 0.00818818 0.34822 0.729299 -0.013640553
X Variable 1 -0.14984 0.116613619 -1.28493 0.20539 -0.384712551
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Figure 12. Scatter plot showing relationship between women representation on board and ROE 
(Original 2018) 
 
 
 
In addition to R2, we have to take p-value into consideration. Table 4 shows this param-
eter being equal to 16%, which is lower than before but still not low enough to be 
ignored. 16% chance of correlation being random is too high of a risk to take in assump-
tion that there is a weak negative correlation between two variables. What is more, 
according to Figure 8, with the observation number of 45 (used in this calculation; please 
see Appendix 3), correlation should be at least 0.23 and it is lower in this case. To 
conclude, this analysis does not indicate statistically significant correlation between ROE 
and women representation. 
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Table 4. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for women representation and ROE (Original 2018) 
 
 
 
 
4.4 ROI 
 
Correlation between ROI and women representation on board appeared to be -0.19 in-
terpreted as negative weak.  Only 3,6% of the variables are explained by the linear 
regression, which shows the insignificance of the results. Calculations and the trend im-
age could be found from Appendix 4 and Figure 13 below. 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.208582
R Square 0.043507
Adjusted R Square0.021768
Standard Error 0.302508
Observations 46
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.183146422 0.183146 2.001362 0.16419617
Residual 44 4.026480106 0.091511
Total 45 4.209626528
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.130865 0.046112551 2.837949 0.006843 0.037931344
X Variable 1 -0.91945 0.649927764 -1.41469 0.164196 -2.229292818
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Figure 13. Scatter plot showing relationship between women representation on board and ROI 
(Original 2018) 
 
 
When p-value analysis is concerned (See table 5 below), it highlights a 22% chance for 
a mistake. According to the Figure 8 with a number of observations being 40, the corre-
lation should be at least 0.28. All things considered, there is no reason to count this 
correlation as a valid result. 
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Table 5. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for women representation and ROI (Original 2018) 
 
 
 
4.5 Firm value and innovation 
 
According to our analysis neither firm value nor innovation is seen to be dependent on 
the women representation changes in top management. Both correlations show weak 
positive results of 0.128 and 0.108 respectively.  Results could be found from Appendix 
5 and 6 as well as from the figures 14 and 15.  
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.19434
R Square 0.037768
Adjusted R Square0.013095
Standard Error 0.092702
Observations 41
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.013154933 0.013155 1.530761 0.223396204
Residual 39 0.335155065 0.008594
Total 40 0.348309998
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.006643 0.014881575 0.446423 0.657761 -0.023457345
X Variable 1 -0.24905 0.201292229 -1.23724 0.223396 -0.656198638
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Figure 14. Scatter plot showing relationship between women representation on board and firm 
value (Original 2018) 
 
 
Figure 15. Scatter plot showing relationship between women representation on board and inno-
vation (Original 2018) 
 
 
Even though the correlation coefficients are quite low for the firm value analysis being 
very close to no correlation point, it is worth checking p-value (see Table 6) to be sure. 
Significance F in this analysis is 40%, which is way higher than the allowed 5%. The 
confirmation of invalidity of the result is found from the Figure 8. With the used number 
of variables of 46, the minimum requirement of correlation coefficient to be 0.23 is not 
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reached. Therefore, no statistically significant correlation is found between women rep-
resentation and firm value. 
 
Table 6. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for women representation and firm value (Original 
2018) 
 
 
 
 
For the innovation calculations less data points were used as many companies did not 
invest into innovation at all during decades. 22 observations were considered, therefore 
according to Figure 8 correlation was meant to be at least 0.36 to be statistically signif-
icant. Unfortunately, this is far from the reality (0.108). In addition, p-value is over 60% 
(see Table 7) and is too high of a chance for an error. Conclusion is that there is no 
correlation between board diversity and company’s innovation intensity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.127569
R Square 0.016274
Adjusted R Square-0.00559
Standard Error 0.697665
Observations 47
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.362343017 0.362343 0.744433 0.392819673
Residual 45 21.90316165 0.486737
Total 46 22.26550467
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.119786 0.105022778 1.140569 0.260083 -0.091741014
X Variable 1 1.2905 1.495703033 0.862805 0.39282 -1.722000054
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Table 7. ANOVA table (regression analysis) for women representation and innovation (Original 
2018) 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
All things considered, despite the fact that many authors (Dezsö 2012, Barta et al. 2012, 
Lilienfeld 2014, Elsesser 2016, Shenata et al. 2017, Burke 2016, Flabbi 2017) claimed 
that there was a significant correlation between women representation in top manage-
ment and financial performance either with negative or positive direction, our research 
shows that there is no statistically significant correlation as such. The correlation coeffi-
cient for any of the performance factors had at maximum value of 0.21, which does not 
even qualify for ”moderate” correlation according to Devore and Farnum (2005). More 
importantly, p-values were too high, making correlation random with a high possibility 
for errors. In addition to this, less than 10% of dependant variables were explained by 
women representation on board variable with the regression equation. Due to high sig-
nificance F and p-value levels, no statistically significant correlation has been found. Even 
though, there were coefficients indicating existence of weak correlations for majority of 
the financial performance factors with the women representation, overall result cannot 
be used for the future observations due to high chance for it being random. Therefore, 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.10770429
R Square 0.01160021
Adjusted R Square-0.0354664
Standard Error 0.23036547
Observations 23
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.01307939 0.013079 0.246464 0.624733032
Residual 21 1.11443325 0.053068
Total 22 1.12751263
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 0.11707623 0.05121039 2.286181 0.032735 0.01057839
X Variable 1 0.304986 0.61433265 0.496451 0.624733 -0.972588679
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our research supports the findings of authors, such as Eagly (2016), partly Dezsö (2012), 
Dale-Olsen et al. (2013) and Horak (2017), who reported either no correlation between 
two examined variables or statistically not significant results (high significance F = high 
p-value and high chance for the error). 
 
As a result, both hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive correlation between women representation in top man-
agement and financial performance of the company. 
 
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive correlation between women representation in top man-
agement and investment intensity; have to be rejected and conclusion should state that 
correlation between financial performance and women representation on board was not 
found during this research due to results being of low statistical significance and weak. 
 
5.1 Critique and limitations 
 
The research has several limitations that are brought to the reader’s attention in this 
part, therefore all the results have to be used with caution. 
 
The accuracy of analysis might be questioned as other variables influencing performance 
are not taken into account due to the resource and time limits. For example, country 
variable and board size variables could have been omitted as explained in the method-
ology part, however industry factor had to be taken into account. For instance, having 
females on the board of cosmetic company might have more influence than in automo-
tive industry. On the other hand, having an opposite gender on the board of the untra-
ditional for them industry might have unpredictable impact and foster diversity and in-
novation (Horak 2017:848) as discussed in this paper. But overall, industry variable 
would make research more accurate (Pletzer et al. 2015). 
 
What is more, company strategy change and any other managerial improvements could 
influence company performance, but could not possibly be reflected in the research. 
 
Another issue in this research might be the number of the companies analysed, which 
influences the accuracy of the research. The bigger sample is taken, the more accurate 
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the results are. This research was using sample of less than 10% due to limited time 
and the information availability (the lower in the S&P ranking company is, the harder is 
to find Annual Report data freely available in the Internet or database). 
 
The main issue in this research is the direction of causality. It is very hard to identify 
whether female directors contribute to the better economic performance or well-per-
forming companies tend to diversify their top management. Even though, Smith et al. 
(2006: 571) managed to find out in their research that board diversity influences perfor-
mance and not the opposite, this test has to be performed in every research on this 
topic. However, due to time constraints, it was impossible to perform this time. 
 
We also need to remember that not always the financial performance improves and 
indicates changes that fast, as managing diversity is a costly and time-consuming pro-
cess (Smth et al. 2006: 572). Therefore, the year difference of 3 years used in this 
research might be too low for reflecting those processes in the results. On the other 
hand, processes started before 2013 might not be reflected in 2013 results but already 
are in 2016 data meaning some of the changed are reflected and used in the research 
but cannot really be tracked. 
 
Lastly, even though R&D coefficient is an indication for the innovation intensity (innova-
tion in the text), greater investment into innovation does not necessarily guarantee bet-
ter performance. Therefore, it is hard to make conclusions about success of the company 
only by this factor. However, Chen et al. (2016:618) claims that “gender-diverse boards 
reduce the positive relation between R&D and earnings/returns volatility.” 
 
5.2    Future research 
 
This research has identified a weak correlation between two variables with the low sig-
nificance levels. As a result, we do not know whether it is a board factor influencing the 
results or it is just a coincidence that variables are changing together. Therefore, this 
could be one of the directions for the new research. 
 
As this topic is relatively new, there is a lot of space for further research. There are some 
aspects for the research when adding up to this paper. First of all, as mentioned before, 
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test for causality can be performed in the similar researches in the future. However, in 
order for it to be sensible to do, correlation findings need to be statistically significant 
unlike in this paper. What is more, qualitative research based on managerial strategies, 
processes and operational improvements could be conducted to analyse how much it 
influences the firm performance and influences correlation.  
 
This research used a basic definition of correlation to find out whether there is a trend 
of one variable changing in a specific pattern (according to the specific equation) due to 
changes in another not searching for reasons for this trend to appear. More sophisticated 
research could be conducted using all the relevant variables: company size (Pletzer et 
al. 2015, Shenata et al. 2017), board size (Pletzer et al. 2015), industry (Pletzer et al. 
2015), strategic focus on innovation etc. 
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each for the purpose of the board composition change calculations, to avoid 100 addi-
tional references they have been taken away from the thesis. 
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Appendix 1: Correlation between women representation and revenue 
 
Company Revenue Women in the board 
  2013 2016 
Differ-
ence 
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 
170,9
10 
215,6
39 0.26 
10.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 
77,84
9 
85,32
0 0.10 
36.3
6% 
36.3
6% 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 
74,45
2 
135,9
87 0.83 
18.1
8% 
27.2
7% 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 7,872 
27,63
8 2.51 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B 
182,1
50 
2236
04 0.23 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 
71,31
2 
71,89
0 0.01 
23.0
8% 
16.6
7% -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 
96,60
6 
95,66
8 -0.01 
9.09
% 
8.33
% -0.01 
Exxon Mobil Corp 
438,2
55 
226,0
94 -0.48 
15.3
8% 
25.0
0% 0.10 
Alphabet Inc A 
59,82
5 
90,27
2 0.51 
27.2
7% 
28.5
7% 0.01 
Bank of America Corporation 
88,94
2 
83,70
1 -0.06 
26.6
7% 
28.5
7% 0.02 
Wells Fargo & Company 
83,78
0 
88,26
7 0.05 
28.5
7% 
35.7
1% 0.07 
AT&T Inc. 
128,7
52 
163,7
86 0.27 
28.5
7% 
30.7
7% 0.02 
Home Depot Inc. 
74,75
4 
88,51
9 0.18 
23.0
8% 
27.2
7% 0.04 
Chevron Corporation 
228,8
48 
114,4
72 -0.50 
25.0
0% 
37.5
0% 0.13 
UnitedHealth Group Incorpo-
rated 
122,4
89 
184,8
40 0.51 
18.1
8% 
23.0
8% 0.05 
Visa Inc. Class A 
11,77
8 
15,08
2 0.28 
30.0
0% 
27.2
7% -0.03 
Intel Corporation 
52,70
8 
59,38
7 0.13 
20.0
0% 
18.1
8% -0.02 
Procter & Gamble Company 
84,16
7 
65,29
9 -0.22 
41.6
7% 
36.3
6% -0.05 
Pfizer Inc. 
51,58
4 
52,82
4 0.02 
33.3
3% 
25.0
0% -0.08 
Verizon Communications Inc. 
120,5
50 
125,9
80 0.05 
35.7
1% 
33.3
3% -0.02 
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Cisco Systems Inc. 
48,60
7 
49,24
7 0.01 
10.0
0% 
33.3
3% 0.23 
Citigroup Inc. 
76,36
6 
69,87
5 -0.08 
25.0
0% 
29.4
1% 0.04 
Boeing Company 
86,62
3 
94,57
1 0.09 
18.1
8% 
15.3
8% -0.03 
Comcast Corporation Class A 
64,65
7 
80,40
3 0.24 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
AbbVie Inc. 
18,79
0 
25,63
8 0.36 
11.1
1% 
20.0
0% 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company 
46,85
4 
41,86
3 -0.11 
26.3
2% 
29.4
1% 0.03 
DowDuPont Inc. 
57,08
0 
48,15
8 -0.16 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc. 
66,41
5 
62,79
9 -0.05 
38.4
6% 
28.5
7% -0.10 
Walt Disney Company 
45,04
1 
55,63
2 0.24 
36.3
6% 
27.2
7% -0.09 
Mastercard Incorporated Class 
A 8,346 
10,77
6 0.29 
18.1
8% 
25.0
0% 0.07 
Philip Morris International Inc. 
31,21
7 
26,68
5 -0.15 
16.6
7% 
15.3
8% -0.01 
Merck & Co. Inc. 
44,03
3 
39,80
7 -0.10 
16.6
7% 
30.7
7% 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 
37,18
0 
37,04
7 0.00 
16.6
7% 
14.2
9% -0.02 
3M Company 
30,87
1 
30,10
9 -0.02 
18.1
8% 
18.1
8% 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 4,280 5,010 0.17 
0.00
% 
16.6
7% 0.17 
International Business Ma-
chines Corporation 
99,75
1 
79,91
9 -0.20 
23.0
8% 
21.4
3% -0.02 
General Electric Company 
146,0
45 
123,6
93 -0.15 
29.4
1% 
23.5
3% -0.06 
McDonald's Corporation 
28,10
6 
24,62
2 -0.12 
30.7
7% 
25.0
0% -0.06 
Amgen Inc. 
18,67
6 
22,99
1 0.23 
13.3
3% 
23.5
3% 0.10 
Altria Group Inc. 
17,66
3 
19,33
7 0.09 
18.1
8% 
18.1
8% 0.00 
Honeywell International Inc. 
39,05
5 
39,30
2 0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Netflix Inc. 4,375 8,831 1.02 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Medtronic plc 
16,59
0 
28,83
3 0.74 
25.0
0% 
30.7
7% 0.06 
Gilead Sciences Inc. 
11,20
2 
30,39
0 1.71 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 
16,38
5 
19,42
7 0.19 
18.1
8% 
14.2
9% -0.04 
Union Pacific Corporation 
21,96
3 
19,94
1 -0.09 
7.69
% 
9.09
% 0.01 
Texas Instruments Incorpo-
rated 
12,20
5 
13,37
0 0.10 
36.3
6% 
30.7
7% -0.06 
Correlation     0.00140       
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Appendix 2: Correlation between women representation and ROA 
 
Company ROA Women in the board 
  
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 
19.34
% 
14.93
% -0.04 
10.00
% 
20.00
% 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 
16.58
% 
9.08
% -0.08 
36.36
% 
36.36
% 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 
0.75
% 
3.19
% 0.02 
18.18
% 
27.27
% 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 
9.04
% 
17.82
% 0.09 
20.00
% 
20.00
% 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B 
4.27
% 
4.10
% 0.00 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 
10.89
% 
12.05
% 0.01 
23.08
% 
16.67
% -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 
0.70
% 
0.95
% 0.00 
9.09
% 
8.33
% -0.01 
Exxon Mobil Corp 
9.57
% 
2.35
% -0.07 
15.38
% 
25.00
% 0.10 
Alphabet Inc A 
12.62
% 
12.37
% 0.00 
27.27
% 
28.57
% 0.01 
Bank of America Corporation 
0.47
% 
0.75
% 0.00 
26.67
% 
28.57
% 0.02 
Wells Fargo & Company 
1.42
% 
1.10
% 0.00 
28.57
% 
35.71
% 0.07 
AT&T Inc. 
6.63
% 
3.22
% -0.03 
28.57
% 
30.77
% 0.02 
Home Depot Inc. 
11.11
% 
16.99
% 0.06 
23.08
% 
27.27
% 0.04 
Chevron Corporation 
8.80
% 
-
0.19
% -0.09 
25.00
% 
37.50
% 0.13 
UnitedHealth Group Incorpo-
rated 
6.91
% 
5.99
% -0.01 
18.18
% 
23.08
% 0.05 
Visa Inc. Class A 
13.11
% 
11.49
% -0.02 
30.00
% 
27.27
% -0.03 
Intel Corporation 
10.89
% 
9.53
% -0.01 
20.00
% 
18.18
% -0.02 
Procter & Gamble Company 
8.15
% 
7.99
% 0.00 
41.67
% 
36.36
% -0.05 
Pfizer Inc. 
12.30
% 
4.26
% -0.08 
33.33
% 
25.00
% -0.08 
Verizon Communications Inc. 
4.61
% 
5.37
% 0.01 
35.71
% 
33.33
% -0.02 
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Cisco Systems Inc. 
10.35
% 
9.13
% -0.01 
10.00
% 
33.33
% 0.23 
Citigroup Inc. 
0.72
% 
0.77
% 0.00 
25.00
% 
29.41
% 0.04 
Boeing Company 
5.05
% 
5.31
% 0.00 
18.18
% 
15.38
% -0.03 
Comcast Corporation Class A 
4.21
% 
5.01
% 0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
AbbVie Inc. 
14.69
% 
9.94
% -0.05 
11.11
% 
20.00
% 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company 
9.74
% 
7.36
% -0.02 
26.32
% 
29.41
% 0.03 
DowDuPont Inc. 
6.39
% 
5.39
% -0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc. 
8.85
% 
8.79
% 0.00 
38.46
% 
28.57
% -0.10 
Walt Disney Company 
7.86
% 
10.42
% 0.03 
36.36
% 
27.27
% -0.09 
Mastercard Incorporated Class A 
23.34
% 
23.23
% 0.00 
18.18
% 
25.00
% 0.07 
Philip Morris International Inc. 
22.50
% 
19.63
% -0.03 
16.67
% 
15.38
% -0.01 
Merck & Co. Inc. 
4.16
% 
3.98
% 0.00 
16.67
% 
30.77
% 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 
13.64
% 
7.98
% -0.06 
16.67
% 
14.29
% -0.02 
3M Company 
13.82
% 
15.39
% 0.02 
18.18
% 
18.18
% 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 
9.40
% 
8.43
% -0.01 
0.00
% 
16.67
% 0.17 
International Business Machines 
Corporation 
13.43
% 
10.42
% -0.03 
23.08
% 
21.43
% -0.02 
General Electric Company 
1.95
% 
1.91
% 0.00 
29.41
% 
23.53
% -0.06 
McDonald's Corporation 
15.51
% 
13.59
% -0.02 
30.77
% 
25.00
% -0.06 
Amgen Inc. 
8.44
% 
10.35
% 0.02 
13.33
% 
23.53
% 0.10 
Altria Group Inc. 
12.92
% 
36.23
% 0.23 
18.18
% 
18.18
% 0.00 
Honeywell International Inc. 
8.99
% 
9.30
% 0.00 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Netflix Inc. 
2.40
% 
1.57
% -0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Medtronic plc 
10.21
% 
3.43
% -0.07 
25.00
% 
30.77
% 0.06 
Gilead Sciences Inc. 
14.06
% 
24.81
% 0.11 
20.00
% 
20.00
% 0.00 
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 
6.88
% 
13.62
% 0.07 
18.18
% 
14.29
% -0.04 
Union Pacific Corporation 
9.06
% 
7.67
% -0.01 
7.69
% 
9.09
% 0.01 
Texas Instruments Incorporated 
11.10
% 
22.01
% 0.11 
36.36
% 
30.77
% -0.06 
Correlation     
-
0.18813       
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Appendix 3: Correlation between women representation and ROE 
 
Company ROE Women in the board 
  2013 2016 
Differ-
ence 
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 
30.64
% 
36.90
% 0.06 
10.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 
30.09
% 
22.09
% -0.08 
36.3
6% 
36.3
6% 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 
3.06
% 
14.52
% 0.11 
18.1
8% 
27.2
7% 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 
10.95
% 
19.70
% 0.09 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B 
9.51
% 
8.94
% -0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 
19.92
% 
23.37
% 0.03 
23.0
8% 
16.6
7% -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 
8.40
% 
10.27
% 0.02 
9.09
% 
8.33
% -0.01 
Exxon Mobil Corp 
19.17
% 
4.64
% -0.15 
15.3
8% 
25.0
0% 0.10 
Alphabet Inc A 
16.25
% 
13.85
% -0.02 
27.2
7% 
28.5
7% 0.01 
Bank of America Corporation 
4.61
% 
6.82
% 0.02 
26.6
7% 
28.5
7% 0.02 
Wells Fargo & Company 
13.99
% 
11.78
% -0.02 
28.5
7% 
35.7
1% 0.07 
AT&T Inc. 
19.91
% 
10.56
% -0.09 
28.5
7% 
30.7
7% 0.02 
Home Depot Inc. 
25.42
% 
89.64
% 0.64 
23.0
8% 
27.2
7% 0.04 
Chevron Corporation 
15.00
% 
-
0.33
% -0.15 
25.0
0% 
37.5
0% 0.13 
UnitedHealth Group Incorpo-
rated 
17.76
% 
19.46
% 0.02 
18.1
8% 
23.0
8% 0.05 
Visa Inc. Class A 
18.28
% 
21.01
% 0.03 
30.0
0% 
27.2
7% -0.03 
Intel Corporation 
17.58
% 
16.21
% -0.01 
20.0
0% 
18.1
8% -0.02 
Procter & Gamble Company 
17.14
% 
17.43
% 0.00 
41.6
7% 
36.3
6% -0.05 
Pfizer Inc. 
27.94
% 
11.62
% -0.16 
33.3
3% 
25.0
0% -0.08 
Verizon Communications Inc. 
31.94
% 
67.40
% 0.35 
35.7
1% 
33.3
3% -0.02 
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Cisco Systems Inc. 
18.08
% 
17.42
% -0.01 
10.0
0% 
33.3
3% 0.23 
Citigroup Inc. 
7.02
% 
6.64
% 0.00 
25.0
0% 
29.4
1% 0.04 
Boeing Company 
44.21
% 
136.8
0% 0.93 
18.1
8% 
15.3
8% -0.03 
Comcast Corporation Class A 
13.63
% 
16.37
% 0.03 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
AbbVie Inc. 
105.1
1% 
138.0
5% 0.33 
11.1
1% 
20.0
0% 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company 
26.03
% 
26.85
% 0.01 
26.3
2% 
29.4
1% 0.03 
DowDuPont Inc. 
22.36
% 
16.80
% -0.06 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc. 
28.96
% 
54.68
% 0.26 
38.4
6% 
28.5
7% -0.10 
Walt Disney Company 
14.41
% 
21.39
% 0.07 
36.3
6% 
27.2
7% -0.09 
Mastercard Incorporated Class 
A 
43.27
% 
69.48
% 0.26 
18.1
8% 
25.0
0% 0.07 
Philip Morris International Inc.       
16.6
7% 
15.3
8%  
Merck & Co. Inc. 
8.57
% 
9.25
% 0.01 
16.6
7% 
30.7
7% 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 
24.74
% 
18.55
% -0.06 
16.6
7% 
14.2
9% -0.02 
3M Company 
26.56
% 
45.90
% 0.19 
18.1
8% 
18.1
8% 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 
12.54
% 
13.82
% 0.01 
0.00
% 
16.6
7% 0.17 
International Business Ma-
chines Corporation 
79.15
% 
73.04
% -0.06 
23.0
8% 
21.4
3% -0.02 
General Electric Company 
10.30
% 
9.39
% -0.01 
29.4
1% 
23.5
3% -0.06 
McDonald's Corporation 
35.69
% 
191.9
3% 1.56 
30.7
7% 
25.0
0% -0.06 
Amgen Inc. 
24.69
% 
26.65
% 0.02 
13.3
3% 
23.5
3% 0.10 
Altria Group Inc. 
124.4
7% 
181.6
6% 0.57 
18.1
8% 
18.1
8% 0.00 
Honeywell International Inc. 
25.78
% 
25.54
% 0.00 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Netflix Inc. 
10.82
% 
7.61
% -0.03 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Medtronic plc 
19.38
% 
6.72
% -0.13 
25.0
0% 
30.7
7% 0.06 
Gilead Sciences Inc. 
29.74
% 
72.16
% 0.42 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 
17.81
% 
29.28
% 0.11 
18.1
8% 
14.2
9% -0.04 
Union Pacific Corporation 
21.35
% 
20.83
% -0.01 
7.69
% 
9.09
% 0.01 
Texas Instruments Incorpo-
rated 
19.86
% 
35.21
% 0.15 
36.3
6% 
30.7
7% -0.06 
Correlation     -0.209       
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Appendix 4: Correlation between women representation and ROI 
 
Company ROI Women in the board 
  
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 
26.08
% 
21.95
% -0.04 
10.00
% 
20.00
% 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 
25.07
% 
14.18
% -0.11 
36.36
% 
36.36
% 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 
2.55
% 
8.42
% 0.06 
18.18
% 
27.27
% 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 
10.08
% 
19.38
% 0.09 
20.00
% 
20.00
% 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B       
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 
16.39
% 
17.86
% 0.01 
23.08
% 
16.67
% -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co     0.00 
9.09
% 
8.33
% -0.01 
Exxon Mobil Corp 
17.42
% 
3.94
% -0.13 
15.38
% 
25.00
% 0.10 
Alphabet Inc A 
14.52
% 
13.85
% -0.01 
27.27
% 
28.57
% 0.01 
Bank of America Corporation       
26.67
% 
28.57
%  
Wells Fargo & Company       
28.57
% 
35.71
%  
AT&T Inc. 
12.73
% 
6.57
% -0.06 
28.57
% 
30.77
% 0.02 
Home Depot Inc. 
17.18
% 
27.66
% 0.10 
23.08
% 
27.27
% 0.04 
Chevron Corporation 
13.46
% 
-
0.20
% -0.14 
25.00
% 
37.50
% 0.13 
UnitedHealth Group Incorpo-
rated 
12.53
% 
11.16
% -0.01 
18.18
% 
23.08
% 0.05 
Visa Inc. Class A 
18.28
% 
14.21
% -0.04 
30.00
% 
27.27
% -0.03 
Intel Corporation 
14.27
% 
12.24
% -0.02 
20.00
% 
18.18
% -0.02 
Procter & Gamble Company 
12.09
% 
11.82
% 0.00 
41.67
% 
36.36
% -0.05 
Pfizer Inc. 
19.65
% 
7.63
% -0.12 
33.33
% 
25.00
% -0.08 
Verizon Communications Inc. 
12.49
% 
12.38
% 0.00 
35.71
% 
33.33
% -0.02 
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Cisco Systems Inc. 
13.88
% 
11.81
% -0.02 
10.00
% 
33.33
% 0.23 
Citigroup Inc.       
25.00
% 
29.41
%  
Boeing Company 
23.88
% 
38.13
% 0.14 
18.18
% 
15.38
% -0.03 
Comcast Corporation Class A 
8.99
% 
9.60
% 0.01 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
AbbVie Inc. 
22.71
% 
17.26
% -0.05 
11.11
% 
20.00
% 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company 
12.58
% 
9.53
% -0.03 
26.32
% 
29.41
% 0.03 
DowDuPont Inc. 
13.20
% 
11.01
% -0.02 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc. 
14.07
% 
15.51
% 0.01 
38.46
% 
28.57
% -0.10 
Walt Disney Company 
11.02
% 
15.26
% 0.04 
36.36
% 
27.27
% -0.09 
Mastercard Incorporated Class A 
43.04
% 
40.96
% -0.02 
18.18
% 
25.00
% 0.07 
Philip Morris International Inc.       
16.67
% 
15.38
%  
Merck & Co. Inc. 
6.52
% 
6.21
% -0.003 
16.67
% 
30.77
% 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 
18.74
% 
10.59
% -0.082 
16.67
% 
14.29
% -0.02 
3M Company 
20.05
% 
23.22
% 0.03 
18.18
% 
18.18
% 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 
12.17
% 
9.46
% -0.03 
0.00
% 
16.67
% 0.17 
International Business Machines 
Corporation 
29.24
% 
21.60
% -0.08 
23.08
% 
21.43
% -0.02 
General Electric Company 
4.79
% 
5.09
% 0.003 
29.41
% 
23.53
% -0.06 
McDonald's Corporation 
20.12
% 
19.22
% -0.01 
30.77
% 
25.00
% -0.06 
Amgen Inc. 
10.18
% 
12.44
% 0.02 
13.33
% 
23.53
% 0.10 
Altria Group Inc. 
29.26
% 
69.27
% 0.40 
18.18
% 
18.18
% 0.00 
Honeywell International Inc. 
17.59
% 
15.22
% -0.02 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Netflix Inc. 
8.83
% 
5.53
% -0.03 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Medtronic plc 
12.58
% 
5.00
% -0.08 
25.00
% 
30.77
% 0.06 
Gilead Sciences Inc. 
18.56
% 
33.19
% 0.15 
20.00
% 
20.00
% 0.00 
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 
12.31
% 
20.91
% 0.09 
18.18
% 
14.29
% -0.04 
Union Pacific Corporation 
15.80
% 
13.35
% -0.02 
7.69
% 
9.09
% 0.01 
Texas Instruments Incorporated 
13.67
% 
25.92
% 0.12 
36.36
% 
30.77
% -0.06 
Correlation     -0.19       
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Appendix 5: Correlation between women representation and firm value 
 
Company 
Total As-
sets 
Total lia-
bilities Firm value 
Women in 
the board 
  
201
3 
201
6 
201
3 
201
6 
20
13 
20
16 
Dif-
fer-
ence 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 
207,
000 
321,
686 
83,4
51 
193,
437 
123
,54
9 
128
,24
9 0.04 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 
142,
431 
193,
694 
63,4
87 
121,
697 
78,
944 
71,
997 -0.09 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 
40,1
59 
83,4
02 
30,4
13 
64,1
17 
9,7
46 
19,
285 0.98 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 
17,8
95 
64,9
61 
2,42
5 
5,76
7 
15,
470 
59,
194 2.83 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B 
484,
931 
620,
854 
263,
041 
337,
853 
221
,89
0 
283
,00
1 0.28 0.00 
Johnson & Johnson 
132,
683 
141,
208 
58,6
30 
70,7
90 
74,
053 
70,
418 -0.05 -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 
2,41
5,68
9 
2,49
0,97
2 
2,20
4,51
1 
2,23
6,78
2 
211
,17
8 
254
,19
0 0.20 -0.01 
Exxon Mobil Corp 
346,
808 
330,
314 
172,
805 
162,
989 
174
,00
3 
167
,32
5 -0.04 0.10 
Alphabet Inc A 
110,
920 
167,
497 
23,6
11 
28,4
61 
87,
309 
139
,03
6 0.59 0.01 
Bank of America Cor-
poration 
2,10
2,27
3 
2,18
7,70
2 
1,86
9,58
8 
1,92
0,86
2 
232
,68
5 
266
,84
0 0.15 0.02 
Wells Fargo & Com-
pany 
1527
015 
1930
115 
1356
873 
1730
534 
170
,14
2 
199
,58
1 0.17 0.07 
AT&T Inc. 
2777
87 
4038
21 
1867
99 
2806
86 
90,
988 
123
,13
5 0.35 0.02 
Home Depot Inc. 
4108
4 
4254
9 
2330
7 
3623
3 
17,
777 
6,3
16 -0.64 0.04 
Chevron Corporation 
2537
53 
2600
78 
1046
40 
1145
22 
149
,11
3 
145
,55
6 -0.02 0.13 
UnitedHealth Group 
Incorporated 
8188
2 
1228
10 
4973
3 
8453
6 
32,
149 
38,
274 0.19 0.05 
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Visa Inc. Class A 
3595
6 
6403
5 9086 
3112
3 
26,
870 
32,
912 0.22 -0.03 
Intel Corporation 
9235
8 
1133
27 
3410
2 
4710
1 
58,
256 
66,
226 0.14 -0.02 
Procter & Gamble 
Company 
1392
63 
1271
36 
7119
9 
6979
5 
68,
064 
57,
341 -0.16 -0.05 
Pfizer Inc. 
1721
01 
1716
15 
9579
4 
1120
71 
76,
307 
59,
544 -0.22 -0.08 
Verizon Communica-
tions Inc. 
2740
98 
2441
80 
2352
62 
2216
56 
38,
836 
22,
524 -0.42 -0.02 
Cisco Systems Inc. 
1011
91 
1216
52 
4207
1 
5806
6 
59,
120 
63,
586 0.08 0.23 
Citigroup Inc. 
1880
382 
1792
077 
1676
043 
1566
957 
204
,33
9 
225
,12
0 0.10 0.04 
Boeing Company 
9266
3 
8999
7 
7778
8 
8918
0 
14,
875 817 -0.95 -0.03 
Comcast Corporation 
Class A 
1588
13 
1805
00 
1081
19 
1265
57 
50,
694 
53,
943 0.06 0.00 
AbbVie Inc. 
2919
8 
6609
9 
2470
6 
6146
3 
4,4
92 
4,6
36 0.03 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company 
9005
5 
8727
0 
5688
2 
6420
8 
33,
173 
23,
062 -0.30 0.03 
DowDuPont Inc. 
6950
1 
7951
1 
4260
3 
5352
4 
26,
898 
25,
987 -0.03 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc. 
7747
8 
7412
9 
5319
9 
6288
3 
24,
279 
11,
246 -0.54 -0.10 
Walt Disney Company 
8124
1 
9203
3 
3581
2 
4876
8 
45,
429 
43,
265 -0.05 -0.09 
Mastercard Incorpo-
rated Class A 
1424
2 
1867
5 6758 
1301
9 
7,4
84 
5,6
56 -0.24 0.07 
Philip Morris Interna-
tional Inc. 
3816
8 
3685
1 
4593
4 
4953
9 
-
7,7
66 
-
12,
688 0.63 -0.01 
Merck & Co. Inc. 
1056
45 
9537
7 
5588
0 
5528
9 
49,
765 
40,
088 -0.19 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 
8181
2 
1121
80 
3716
4 
6489
1 
44,
648 
47,
289 0.06 -0.02 
3M Company 
3355
0 
3290
6 
1604
8 
2260
8 
17,
502 
10,
298 -0.41 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 6412 7370 1585 2901 
4,8
27 
4,4
69 -0.07 0.17 
International Business 
Machines Corporation 
1262
23 
1122
46 
1034
31 
9922
4 
22,
792 
13,
022 -0.43 -0.02 
General Electric Com-
pany 
6565
60 
3651
83 
5259
94 
2893
55 
130
,56
6 
75,
828 -0.42 -0.06 
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McDonald's Corpora-
tion 
3662
6 
3102
4 
2061
7 
3322
8 
16,
009 
-
2,2
04 -1.14 -0.06 
Amgen Inc. 
6612
5 
7762
6 
4402
9 
4775
1 
22,
096 
29,
875 0.35 0.10 
Altria Group Inc. 
3485
9 
4593
2 
3074
0 
3316
2 
4,1
19 
12,
770 2.10 0.00 
Honeywell Interna-
tional Inc. 
4543
5 
5414
6 
2796
8 
3477
7 
17,
467 
19,
369 0.11 0.00 
Netflix Inc. 5413 
1358
7 4079 
1090
7 
1,3
34 
2,6
80 1.01 0.00 
Medtronic plc 
3484
1 
9978
2 
1617
0 
4771
9 
18,
671 
52,
063 1.79 0.06 
Gilead Sciences Inc. 
2249
7 
5697
7 
1112
8 
3809
0 
11,
369 
18,
887 0.66 0.00 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company 
3859
2 
3370
7 
2343
8 
1753
0 
15,
154 
16,
177 0.07 -0.04 
Union Pacific Corpora-
tion 
4973
1 
5571
8 
2850
6 
3578
6 
21,
225 
19,
932 -0.06 0.01 
Texas Instruments In-
corporated 
1893
8 
1643
1 8131 5958 
10,
807 
10,
473 -0.03 -0.06 
Correlation             0.128   
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Appendix 6: Correlation between women representation and innova-
tion 
 
Company 
Innovation intensity 
(R&D ratio) Women in the board 
  2013 2016 
Differ-
ence 
201
3 
201
6 
Differ-
ence 
Apple Inc. 2.62 4.66 0.78 
10.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.10 
Microsoft Corp 13.37 14.05 0.05 
36.3
6% 
36.3
6% 0.00 
Amazon.com Inc 8.82 11.83 0.34 
18.1
8% 
27.2
7% 0.09 
Facebook Inc A 17.98 21.42 0.19 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
Berkshire Hathaway B       
0.00
% 
0.00
%  
Johnson & Johnson 11.47 12.65 0.10 
23.0
8% 
16.6
7% -0.06 
JP Morgan Chase & Co       
9.09
% 
8.33
%  
Exxon Mobil Corp       
15.3
8% 
25.0
0%  
Alphabet Inc A 12.86 15.45 0.20 
27.2
7% 
28.5
7% 0.01 
Bank of America Corporation       
26.6
7% 
28.5
7%  
Wells Fargo & Company       
28.5
7% 
35.7
1%  
AT&T Inc.       
28.5
7% 
30.7
7%  
Home Depot Inc.       
23.0
8% 
27.2
7%  
Chevron Corporation       
25.0
0% 
37.5
0%  
UnitedHealth Group Incorpo-
rated       
18.1
8% 
23.0
8%  
Visa Inc. Class A       
30.0
0% 
27.2
7%  
Intel Corporation 20.13 21.45 0.07 
20.0
0% 
18.1
8% -0.02 
Procter & Gamble Company       
41.6
7% 
36.3
6%  
Pfizer Inc. 12.95 14.9 0.15 
33.3
3% 
25.0
0% -0.08 
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Verizon Communications Inc.       
35.7
1% 
33.3
3%  
Cisco Systems Inc. 12.22 12.78 0.05 
10.0
0% 
33.3
3% 0.23 
Citigroup Inc.       
25.0
0% 
29.4
1%  
Boeing Company 3.55 4.89 0.38 
18.1
8% 
15.3
8% -0.03 
Comcast Corporation Class A       
0.00
% 
0.00
%  
AbbVie Inc. 16.99 17.81 0.05 
11.1
1% 
20.0
0% 0.09 
Coca-Cola Company       
26.3
2% 
29.4
1%  
DowDuPont Inc. 3.06 3.29 0.08 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
PepsiCo Inc.       
38.4
6% 
28.5
7%  
Walt Disney Company       
36.3
6% 
27.2
7%  
Mastercard Incorporated Class 
A       
18.1
8% 
25.0
0%  
Philip Morris International Inc.       
16.6
7% 
15.3
8%  
Merck & Co. Inc. 17.04 25.43 0.49 
16.6
7% 
30.7
7% 0.14 
Oracle Corporation 13.04 15.62 0.20 
16.6
7% 
14.2
9% -0.02 
3M Company 5.56 5.76 0.04 
18.1
8% 
18.1
8% 0.00 
NVIDIA Corporation 26.8 26.57 -0.01 
0.00
% 
16.6
7% 0.17 
International Business Ma-
chines Corporation 5.84 7.2 0.23 
23.0
8% 
21.4
3% -0.02 
General Electric Company       
29.4
1% 
23.5
3%  
McDonald's Corporation       
30.7
7% 
25.0
0%  
Amgen Inc. 21.86 16.7 -0.24 
13.3
3% 
23.5
3% 0.10 
Altria Group Inc.       
18.1
8% 
18.1
8%  
Honeywell International Inc.       
0.00
% 
0.00
%  
Netflix Inc. 8.66 9.65 0.11 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00 
Medtronic plc 9.39 7.71 -0.18 
25.0
0% 
30.7
7% 0.06 
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Gilead Sciences Inc. 18.93 16.78 -0.11 
20.0
0% 
20.0
0% 0.00 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 22.77 25.43 0.12 
18.1
8% 
14.2
9% -0.04 
Union Pacific Corporation       
7.69
% 
9.09
%  
Texas Instruments Incorpo-
rated 12.47 10.14 -0.19 
36.3
6% 
30.7
7% -0.06 
Correlation     0.10770       
 
 
